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A Study of Kiyozawa Manshi’s Thought 
about “In Our Power and not in Our Power” 
in Diary ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ
KAWAGUCHI Atsushi
₁．Introduction
“Beginning with the Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ movement in the early ₂₀th century, modern 
Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies of the Ōtani-ha has tended to focus on indi-
vidual awakening of Other-Power faith through the realization of one’s finite 
nature.  Critics of this approach have argued that it lacks social consideration 
of ‘benefit for others,’ which is an essential aspect of Mahāyāna B
1
uddhism.”
　Kiyozawa Manshi (₁₈₆₈‒₁₉₀₃) was a Meiji-period Japanese philosopher and 
Buddhist minister belonging to the Higashi Honganiji denomination大谷派．As 
noted in the quotation above, his thought has been being criticized by some 
researchers for its supposed defects in regard to society and ethics.  Such 
critics have argued that his thought lapses into self-absorption and complete 
acceptance of society as it is.  In addressing this panel’s topic of “benefit for 
others”, we need to reconsider this issue of Kiyozawa’s apparent complete 
acceptance of society as it is.
　Japanese scholarship on Kiyozawa’s thought and “Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ” 「精神主義」
has strongly tended to understand the basic standpoint of his thought in terms 
of “如意なるもの、不如意なるもの (nyoinarumono funyoinarumono)”, a phrase 
１ From panel abstract for panel ₉, “‘Benefiting Others’ in Modern Shin Buddhist 
Doctrinal Studies of the Ōtani-ha” in “The₁₈th Biennial Conference of the Inter-
national Association of Shin Buddhist Studies”, (Musashino University, Tokyo, June 
₃₀-July ₂, ₂₀₁₇).
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that Kiyozawa used to translate ideas from Epictetus.  In English, this phrase 
means ‘in one’s power, not in one’s power,’ or more simply, ‘as one likes, not 
as one likes’.  Scholars have understood these words to apply not only to his 
thought but also to the basic standpoint of Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ.
　When we look back on the history of scholarship on Kiyozawa, we can find 
criticisms of Kiyozawa on this point.  It seems difficult to develop “social 
consideration of benefitting others” from his thought.  However, if we were to 
define his thought in terms of consideration of universal deliverance for human 
beings, his thought contains not only aspirations for individual deliverance but 
also aspirations for social development.  In the diary ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ 臘扇記, for 
example, he notes that the “mind of taking refuge 帰命心”, which is the religious 
mind, develops into the “universal harmonious mind 和合心”, the “social mind 
社交心”, the “sympathetic mind 同情心”, and the “mind of compassion 慈悲心
2
”. 
Such phrases show that Kiyozawa insisted on the social development of the 
religious mind.  Elsewhere, he notes that the religious mind is the will to avoid 
evils and to practice virtues 避悪就善の意志, which is given to one by the 
Absolute, or T
3
athāgata.  This signifies a revolution from the religious mind to 
ethical practice.  However, there have been many critiques of Kiyozawa’s “如
意なるもの、不如意なるもの” as lacking social consideration, and of his thought 
as completely submissive and accepting of society as it is.  Therefore, in this 
paper, we will reconsider Kiyozawa’s “如意なるもの、不如意なるもの” and 
attempt to resolve the above-mentioned problems.
₂．On the History of the Study of Kiyozawa’s Thought in Japan
In his diary ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ 臘扇記 on Oct. ₁₂, ₁₈₉₈, Kiyozawa wrote the following:
○如意なるものと不如意なるものあり　如意なるものは意見動作及欣厭な
２ 『清沢満之全集』 Ｋｉｙｏｚａʷａ　 Ｍａｎｓʰｉ　 Ｚｅｎｓʰū (The Collected Works of Kiyozawa 
Manshi, Hereafter abbreviated KMZ), KMZ. Vol. ₈, p. ₃₆₃.
３ Ibid.
27真宗総合研究所研究紀要　第₃₅号
り　不如意なるものは身体財産名誉及官爵なり　己の所作に属するものと
否らさるものとなり　如意なるものに対しては吾人は自由なり制限及妨害
を受くることなきなり　不如意なるものに対しては吾人は微弱なり奴隷な
り他の掌中にあるなり　此区分を誤想するときは吾人は妨害に遭ひ悲歎号
泣に陥り神人を怨謗するに至るなり　如意の区分を守るものは抑圧せら
るヽことなく妨害を受くることなく人を謗らす天を怨みす人に傷けられす
人を傷けず天下に怨敵なきなり
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Of things some are in our power, and others are not.  In our power are 
opinion, movement towards a thing, desire, aversion (turning from a 
thing); and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are 
the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, 
whatever are not our own acts.  And the things in our power are by 
nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in 
our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. 
Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish 
to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your 
own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will 
blame both gods and men: but if you think that only which is your own 
to be your own, and if you think that what is another’s, as it really is, 
belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, 
you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do noth-
ing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have 
no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm. (George Long. ₁₈₇₇. p. ₃₇₉.)
　This quotation has received much attention from Japanese researchers.  Past 
scholarship on Kiyozawa’s thought has often taken this quotation as clearly 
indicating the basic standpoint of his thought.  The source of this understand-
ing probably comes from the work of Yasumaru Yoshio 安丸良夫．Yasumaru 
identified the phrase “如意不如意” from this passage as expressing the essence 
４ KMZ. Vol. ₈, p. ₃₅₆.
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of “ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ” 「精神主義」, and he interpreted the cutting off of  “不如意,” 
or that which is not in one’s power, as implying the abandonment of efforts 
toward social reform.  Thus, Kiyozawa’s religious belief become closely associ-
ated with unconditional and complete acceptance 無条件的な全肯定 of society 
as it i
5
s.  Thereafter, probably due to Yasumaru’s influence, Fukusima Hirotaka 
福島寛隆, Akamatu Tessin 赤松徹真, Kawamoto Yosiaki 川本義昭 and others 
also developed arguments critical of Kiyozawa based on this phrase “in one’s 
power, not in one’s power” 如意不如意．
　In addition, Hishiki Masaharu 菱木政晴 more recently insisted that Kiyozawa’s 
thought entailed unconditional and complete acceptance of society as it is, and 
thus an abandonment of attempts to reform society, because social problems 
are ‘not in one’s power’ 不如意.  According to this viewpoint, Kiyozawa’s ideo-
logical position is that of “unconditional obedience to the Ｔａｔʰāɡａｔａ”.  Kondo 
Shuntaro’s 近藤俊太郎 viewpoint is similar to Hishiki’s in this regard.
　Both Hishiki and Kondo argue that this ideological tendency is shared by 
Kiyozawa and Akegarasu Haya 暁烏敏, a close and loyal follower of Kiyozawa’s. 
For example, Kondo claims that Kiyozawa’s use of the phrase “not in one’s 
power” 不如意 and Akegarasu’s use of the term “obedience” 服従 indicate this 
shared viewpoint.  The basis for this argument can perhaps be found in con-
nections such as the following; Kiyozawa translated Epictetus’s “Encehiridion 
(manual)” as saying we are “weak and slavish” (微弱なり奴隷なり bijyakunari 
doreinari) toward things “not in our power,” whereas Akegarasu, in his “Essay 
on Obedience”「服従論」published in the Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｋａｉ 精神界 journal in ₁₉₀₂, 
says that a believer in the Tathāgata will adopt a “slavish and obedient” atti-
tude toward others.
　 Regarding the interpretation of “如意不如意” among modern scholars of 
Shinran ｋｙōɡａｋｕ, or Shinran doctrinal studies, Nawa Tatsunori 名和達宣 
indicates that this phrase does not represent the conclusion of Kiyozawa’s faith, 
but rather momentum toward recognition of the distinction 分限の自覚 between 
５ Yasumaru Yosio. ₁₉₇₆. p. ₃₃₄.
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‘the sphere of action of one’s self ’ and that of the T
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athāgata.  And according 
to Hisaki Yukio’s 久木幸男 Ｅｘａⅿｉｎａｔｉｏｎ　ｏｆ　ｃｒｉｔｉｃｉｓⅿｓ　ｔｏʷａｒｄ　Ｋｉｙｏｚａʷａ　Ｍａｎｓʰｉ
検証清沢満之批判, although this phrase of Kiyozawa’s indicates the entrance 
of Kiyozawa’s seeking after truth, it is not the peak of his faith; thus, critics 
have mistakenly treated the doorway as the inner r
7
oom.
　However, according to Epictetus, the correct attitude toward “如意不如意” 
is an extremely important matter (p. ₃₇₉).  He claims that it is very important 
that we aim to reach this mental state, which he describes as critical for 
philosophers.  We should carefully consider what Epictetus intended to say 
because Kiyozawa’s phrase is after all a translation of Epictetus’s thought.
₃ ．The Problem of “A Lecture about Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ”「精神主義」
〔明治三十五年講演〕
Keeping these matters in mind, let us change perspectives.  There was evi-
dence showing that Kiyozawa’s thought implied a slavish and obedient attitude 
toward society.  “A Lecture about Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ,” which was published after 
Kiyozawa’s death, mentions the following: “又私共は、社会の不足弊害等に対
して、之れを満たし、之れを正さんとも敢てせんのである。精神主義より云へ
ば、如来の光明は無限であつて、社会に満ちたるのであるから、それに不足や
弊害のあらうとは思ひませぬ。之に不足弊害のあるやうに見るのは、私共の心
の至らないのであります
8
。” (Concerning harmful effects or shortage of provi-
sions in society, we need not supply them or cover them.  According to 
“Seishinshugi 精神主義”, we don’t think that the shortage of provisions are 
harmful because Amida’s Light is infinite and present everywhere in society. 
If you feel harmful effects or shortage of provisions, your mind is still unde-
veloped, and you have to cultivate your mind.)
６ Nawa Tatsunori. ₂₀₁₆.  “The “Excavating” of Kiyozawa Manshi: Rōsen-ki as a 
Cross-section.” p. ₂₆₂.
７ See Hisaki Yukio. ₁₉₉₅. p. ₁₉₃.  He says that “玄関と奥座敷とを間違えた”.
８ KMZ, vol. ₆, pp. ₁₆₇‒.
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　It can readily be imagined that the image of Kiyozawa’s social attitudes had 
been molded by words like these.  However, in recent years, Yamamoto 
Nobuhiro山本伸裕 claimed that there is an important problem with “A Lecture 
about Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ”.  According to Yamamoto, this lecture was actually writ-
ten by Akegarasu.  To elaborate, four years after Kiyozawa’s death, Akegarasu 
obtained a notebook containing someone’s notes on Kiyozawa’s lecture. 
Akegarasu then wrote a composition in order to introduce these notes to 
readers of the journal.  There is evidence to show that it was written by 
Akegarasu.  In particular, Akegarasu himself described such circumstances 
in a footnote in the j
9
ournal.
　Moreover, Yamamoto’s dissertation compared this lecture with others by 
Kiyozawa, revealing the lack of credibility of “A Lecture about Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ.”
　For example, consider the following sentences.  The first is found in “A 
Lecture about Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｓʰｕɡｉ”, while the second is found in “Ｔʰｅ　Ｄｉａｒｙ　ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ”:
無限の大悲に乗托して、安心したものは、自由である。…中略…即ち此場
合の自由とは、自分の心の中に、「他人の事に進んで服従する」と云ふ、自
由であります
10
。
（Those who ride upon the Infinite’s compassion and attain peace of mind 
are free.  ... Thus, the freedom in this case is freedom by which, within 
our minds, we voluntarily obey others.）
決して他人に服従すべき必要なきなり　他人も亦吾人を服従すべき必要な
きなり　故に他人と我人とは同等の位置に住すべきなり
11
（There is certainly no need to obey others; likewise, there is no need for 
others to obey me.  Therefore, others and I reside in an equal position.）
９ See Ｓｅｉｓʰｉｎｋａｉ　ⅿａɡａｚｉｎｅ. ₁₉₀₇. ₇‒₆.
₁₀ KMZ, vol. ₆, p. ₁₆₉.
₁₁ KMZ, vol. ₈, p. ₄₂₇.
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　 “A Lecture about Ｓｅｉｓʰｎｓʰｕɡｉ” greatly contrasts with the “Ｔʰｅ　 Ｄｉａｒｙ　
ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ” 臘扇記 in its use of the term “obedience” 服従．Here we need to 
recon sider what the basic standpoint of Kiyozawa’s thought is.  Moreover, we 
should reconsider Kiyozawa’s views about what is “in our power, not in our 
power”, studying not only Kiyozawa’s understanding but also Epictetus’s.  This 
is because the phrase “如意なるもの…” highlighted in Kiyozawa’s diary is not 
his own creation; rather, it is merely his translation.
₄．What is “In Our Power, Not in Our Power”
　Nearly a month after beginning to write ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ, Kiyozawa went to Tokyo. 
There he borrowed a book from Sawayanagi Masatarō 沢柳政太郎．The book 
was named Ｔʰｅ　Ｄｉｓｃｏｕｒｓｅｓ　ｏｆ　Ｅｐｉｃｔｅｔｕｓ；　ʷｉｔʰ　 ｔʰｅ　Ｅｎｃʰｅｉｒｉｄｉｏｎ　ａｎｄ　Ｆｒａɡ︲
ⅿｅｎｔｓ.  We can identify the book used by Kiyozawa as the ₁₈₇₇ edition of the 
translation by George Long.
　From September ₂₇, Kiyozawa began to write down quotations from this 
book.  In the entry for October ₁₂, rather than directly quoting the English, 
he tried to translate quotations into Japanese.  The translation is comprised 
of excerpts from sections ₁ through ₂₃ of “The Encheiridion, or Manual”.  ‘如
意不如意’ are the first words of Kiyozawa’s translation of section ₁.  According 
to a Japanese dictionary, ‘如意 nyoi’ means ‘思いのままになること、自在なこ
と unrestricted or free, etc.’  By contrast, the words ‘不如意’ thus mean 
‘restricted or unfree’.
　According to some Japanese researchers, the portion of Kiyozawa’s transla-
tion quoted above in section ₂ suggests an attitude of shutting himself off from 
the outside world and sinking into his own mind.  There are some grounds 
for this view.  They note that in Kiyozawa’s translation, it says that everyone 
ought to be slavish and obedient ‘微弱ナリ奴隷ナリ’ toward others and the 
external world.
　However, contrary to such interpretations, the main claim of this passage 
is that one should be ethical regardless of one’s body, property, reputation, or 
offices (magisterial power).  For instance, Epictetus says, “If any of you, 
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withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (προαίρεσις) to 
exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, 
elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned 
that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither 
be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed 
about with them as in tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others 
who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would a
12
void”. 
Therefore, Epictetus hold that what is most important is to be indifferent 
toward externals, such as one’s body, property, reputation, or offices.  That is, 
regardless of whether one becomes ill or not, obtains a lot of property or not, 
acquires a good reputation or not, or attains a high office or not, one should 
be indifferent to such results while always acting ethically.  Personal virtues 
and worldly values are not always the same, so worldly values that we deem 
to be good are not always good.  Epictetus generally tells us that to avoid 
slavishly following externals, such as body, property, reputation, or offices, is 
the most virtuous life, and that you should live in accord with nature or G
13
od. 
Living in accordance with nature is one of Epictetus’s main points.  Externals 
can be understood as things that are under the control of others and not under 
the control of one’s will.  Good and bad lie within the scope of one’s will or 
one’s power 如意．One has to choose and examine virtuous and good things 
apart from externals.  For that reason, Epictetus distinguishes what is “in our 
power” from what is “not in our power.” He goes on to say that what is “in 
one’s power 如意” is the rational faculty of moral approval and disapproval, 
the faculty of pursuing an object or avoiding it, and the faculties of desire and 
₁₂ George Long. ₁₈₇₇. p. ₁₆.
₁₃ For instance, see ɢｅｏｒɡｅ　ʟｏｎɡ Book, ₂.  Chapter, ₁₄. he says, “The philosophers 
say that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he provides for all 
things; also that it is not possible to conceal from him our acts, or even our inten-
tions and thoughts.  The next thing is to learn what is the nature of Gods; for such 
as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with 
all his power to be like them.” (pp. ₁₄₁‒₂.)
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version.  Thus, for Epictetus, the nature of “in one’s power 如意” is not simply 
a state of complete, passive acceptance, but the faculty of moral approval and 
d
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isapproval.
　Epictetus stresses that we should act ethically regardless of our status.  For 
example, he describes how Socrates and several others were ordered by the 
thirty tyrants to arrest Leon on the island of Salamis and to bring him to be 
put to death, but Socrates refused to obey the o
16
rder.  This example unmistak-
ably shows us that Epictetus is not intending to merely disregard social prob-
lems; rather, through his discussion of what is “in one’s power”, he intends to 
demonstrate what moral character is.
　Therefore, in his diary ʀōｓｅｎｋｉ on April ₅, Kiyozawa wrote the following:
エピクテト氏の所謂エクステルナルスに三種の別あり（一）忘念（二）他
人（三）外物　是なり　…外物は畢竟吾人に無関係（インジファレント）の
ものたるべきなり…決して他人に服従すべき必要なきなり　他人も亦吾人
を服従すべき必要なきなり…
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There are three types of externals that Epictetus describes: (₁) delusion 
of losing sight of oneself (₂) other people, (₃) external things....  External 
things ultimately should be indifferent to us....  There is certainly no need 
to obey others; likewise, there is no need for others to obey me.
₁₄ Cf. George Long. ₁₈₇₇. pp. ₂‒₅.
₁₅ Epictetus says, “Of all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you 
will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not 
capable either of approving or disapproving.” (George Long, p. ₂.) The faculty with 
such a capacity which he goes on to describe is none other than the rational 
faculty.
₁₆ George Long says in his book’s footnote; “Socrates with others was ordered by 
the Thirty tyrants, who at that time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island 
of Salamis and to bring him to be put to death.  But Socrates refused to obey the 
order.  Few men would have done what he did under the circumstances. (From 
Plato’s Apology; M. Antoninus, vii. ₆₆.)” (George Long. ₁₈₇₇. p. ₃₁₉.)
₁₇ KMZ. Vol. ₈, pp. ₄₂₆‒₇.
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　 Judging from this quotation, it is evident that Kiyozawa understood 
Epictetus’s thought correctly, and concluded “There is certainly no need to 
obey others; likewise, there is no need for others to obey me.”
　A remarkable statement of Kiyozawa’s is his claim that we should obey (or 
follow) the Tathāgata, but not obey external things or others.  On the one 
hand, the article 「服従論」 by Akegarasu claims that we should obey (or follow) 
not just the Tathāgata but other people, as well.  Therefore, Kiyozawa and 
Akegarasu have different opinions about the use of the terms “obey” and 
“slave”.
　Kiyozawa says, “There is certainly no need to obey others; likewise, there 
is no need for others to obey me.  Therefore, others and I reside in an equal 
position.” Why then did Akegarasu say that we should obey others?
₅．Why did This Ideological Shift Take Place?
　Why did this ideological shift take place?  There is a strong possibility that 
Akegarasu, who is a very creative thinker, got a hint from ‘Nyoi funyoi’, and 
introduced to it new thoughts of his own.  Kiyozawa’s Japanese translation of 
Epictetus can be interpreted in various ways; perhaps his translation invited 
a certain misreading, that is, that one should slavishly obey the demands of 
one’s body, property, reputation, or offices.  Perhaps this is how Akegarasu 
interpreted Kiyozawa’s translation, but such was certainly not Kiyozawa’s 
intention.  Otherwise, how could we explain Kiyozawa and Akegarasu’s polar 
opposite uses of the terms “slavishness” and “obedience” 「奴隷」と「服従」．
　Ｔʰｅ　ʀｏｓｅｎｋｉ　Ｄｉａｒｙ was read freely by Kiyozawa’s good friends and close 
followers.  Misinterpreting the meaning of his translations of Epictetus, new 
ideas were born.
　At the very end of his life, Kiyozawa wrote the following in his diary:
如来の奴隷となれ、其他のものの奴隷となること勿れ
18
（Be the slave of the Tathāgata, but never be a slave of any others.）
₁₈ “明治₃₆年当用日記抄 ” (meij ₃₆ (₁₉₀₂) touyounikkisyou) KMZ. Vol. ₈, p. ₄₅₄.  See 
also “執着は奴隷心の源なり”有限無限録（“Shyū tyaku ha Doreishin no Minamoto 
nari” ʏūɡｅｎ　Ｍｕɡｅｎ　ʀｏｋｕ ₅₃ KMZ. ₂, pp. ₁₂₃‒₄）.
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　Thus, at the very end of his life, he spoke out against slavishly following 
and obeying external things and others.  Is this not a warning against com-
pletely accepting society as it is?  These ideas arose against the backdrop of 
the criticisms of “Seishinshugi” that were being made at the time, which likely 
forced him to rethink what “obedience” is.  One can say this criticism provided 
an opportunity for Kiyozawa to reconsider the foundational facets of 
“Seishinshugi”.
　As stated above, Kiyozawa attached great importance to never being a slave 
of externals.  This aspect of Kiyozawa’s thought has been neglected up until 
now, but it is critical for understanding his ethical views.  I hope that this 
paper serves as gateway to further study of the idea of “benefit for others” 
that is present in Kiyozawa’s thought.
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